Welfare Analysis of a Market with Pairwise Meetings and Asymmetric Information
AbstractWe study the welfare properties of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information, establishing an equivalence between asymptotically ex-post individually rational and asymptotically (ex-ante, interim and ex-post) efficient equilibrium sequences.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 8 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Oved Yosha & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Welfare analysis of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 167-175.
- C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- O11 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O47 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Measurement of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
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- Roberto Serrano, 2000.
"Decentralized Information and the Walrasian Outcome:A Pairwise Meetings Market with Private Values,"
2000-13, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Serrano, Roberto, 2002. "Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: a pairwise meetings market with private values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 65-89, September.
- Serrano, R. & Yosha, O., 1995. "Decentralized Information and the Walrasian Outcome : A Pairwise Meetings Market with Private Values," Papers 26-95, Tel Aviv.
- Max Blouin, 2001. "Equilibrium in a Decentralized Market with Adverse Selection," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 128, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal, revised Mar 2001.
- John Wooders & Diego Moreno, 2001.
"Prices, Delay, and the Dynamics of Trade,"
AccessEcon, vol. 28(7), pages A0.
- Max Blouin & Roberto Serrano, 1998.
"A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States,"
98-5, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised 10 Aug 1998.
- Blouin, Max R & Serrano, Roberto, 2001. "A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(2), pages 323-46, April.
- Isaac, Tanguy, 2011. "A new equilibrium in the one-sided asymmetric information market with pairwise meetings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 152-156, May.
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