References listed on IDEAS
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1. Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-43, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Serrano, Roberto & Yosha, Oved, 1996. "Welfare Analysis of a Market with Pairwise Meetings and Asymmetric Information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 167-75, June.
   Other versions:
   • Oved Yosha & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Welfare analysis of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 167-175.
3. Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 1996. "Learning and Strategic Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(5), pages 1125-49, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1996. "Learning and Strategic Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1113, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
4. Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 785-806, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 807-18, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Rothschild, Michael, 1974. "A two-armed bandit theory of market pricing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 185-202, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Serrano, Roberto & Yosha, Oved, 1993. "Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings: The One Sided Information Case," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 481-99, July.
9. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
10. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1997. "The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1247-1282, November.
    Other versions:
    • Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1995. "The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions," Discussion Papers 1147, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
11. Wilson, Robert, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 511-18, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Gale, Douglas, 1987. "Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 20-54, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
14. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1993. "Sequential Bargaining and Competition," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 353-63, April.
15. Wolinsky, Asher, 1990. "Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 1-23, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Milgrom, Paul R, 1979. "A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 679-88, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. ISAAC, Tanguy, 2006. "Information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings: dynamic case with constant entry flow," CORE Discussion Papers 2006048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
2. Shneyerov, Art & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2007. "The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of a Simple Matching and Bargaining Mechanism," Micro Theory Working Papers shneyerov-07-05-01-03-43-, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 01 May 2007. [Downloadable!]
3. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
4. Diego Moreno & John Wooders, 2001. "The Efficiency Of Decentralized And Centralized Markets For Lemons," Economics Working Papers we014005, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
5. Tanguy, ISAAC, 2006. "Information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings : dynamic case with constant entry flow," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006026, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
6. Max Blouin, 2001. "Equilibrium in a Decentralized Market with Adverse Selection," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 128, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal, revised Mar 2001. [Downloadable!]