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Sequential Bargaining and Competition

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  • Muthoo, Abhinay

Abstract

This paper studies a sequential bargaining model of a decentralized market. A main objective is to explore the conditions under which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the market game approximates the Walrasian outcome of the market. The three main messages that emerge from our results are as follows. First, contrary to conventional wisdom, friction less markets need not be Walrasian. Second, the relative magnitudes of frictions can have a profound impact on the market outcome even in the limit as the absolute magnitudes of the frictions become negligible. And third, the relative magnitudes of certain types of frictions may have to be significantly large in order for markets to be Walrasian, reflecting that certain types of frictions are needed in the market in order to induce the Walrasian outcome.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 3 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 353-63

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:3:y:1993:i:2:p:353-63

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Cited by:
  1. Raskovich, Alexander, 2007. "Ordered bargaining," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1126-1143, October.
  2. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  3. Blouin, Max R & Serrano, Roberto, 2001. "A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(2), pages 323-46, April.
  4. Clara Ponsat?Author-Email: Clara.ponsati@uab.es, 2001. "Search and bargaining in large markets with homogeneous traders," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 533.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).

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