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Information Revelation In A Market With Pairwise Meetings

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  • Wolinsky, Asher

Abstract

The paper presents a simple pairwise meetings model of trade. The new feature is that agents have asymmetric information about the true state of the world. The focus is on the transmission of the information through the process of trade. The qualitative questions is: to what extent is the information revealed to uninformed agents through the trading process, when the market is in some sense frictionless? In particular: does the decentralized process give rise to full revelation results as derived by the literature on rational expectations for centralized and competitive environments? In the context of the model of this paper, it turns out that the information is not fully revealed to uninformed agents, even when the market is in some sense approximately frictionless.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolinsky, Asher, 1987. "Information Revelation In A Market With Pairwise Meetings," Economic Research Papers 268243, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:268243
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.268243
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