Information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings: dynamic case with constant entry flow
AbstractWe study information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings. We focus on the one sided case and perform a dynamic analysis of a constant entry ﬂow model. The same question has been studied in an identical framework in Serrano and Yosha (1993) but they limit their analysis to the stationary steady states. Blouin and Serrano (2001) study information revelation in a one-time entry model and obtain results different than Serrano and Yosha (1993). We show that there is dramatically loss when restricting the analysis of a constant ﬂow entry model to stationary steady states. Nevertheless, we show that this loss might not explain completely the difference in the results presented in the two papers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2006048.
Date of creation: 00 Jun 2006
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D49 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Other
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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