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Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition

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Author Info
Satterthwaite, Mark
Shneyerov, Artyom

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Abstract

Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good. Time is discrete, each period has length ä, and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market to trade. Within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched with zero, one, or more buyers. Every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and, if trade occurs, both the seller and winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility. Traders who fail to trade either continue in the market to be rematched or become discouraged with probability äµ (µ is the discouragement rate) and exit with zero utility. We characterize the steady-state, perfect Bayesian equilibria as ä becomes small and the market–in effect– becomes large. We show that, as ä converges to zero, equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the Walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation.

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Paper provided by Microeconomics.ca Website in its series Micro Theory Working Papers with number shneyerov-03-12-17-09-36-43.

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Date of creation: 17 Dec 2003
Date of revision: 17 Dec 2003
Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:shneyerov-03-12-17-09-36-43

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  3. Spulber, Daniel F, 1996. "Market Microstructure and Intermediation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 135-52, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 785-806, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Rustichini, Aldo & Satterthwaite, Mark A & Williams, Steven R, 1994. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1041-63, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Gianni De Fraja & Jozsef Sakovics, 2001. "Walras Retrouve: Decentralized Trading Mechanisms and the Competitive Price," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 842-863, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1990. "Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(1), pages 63-78, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  25. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Art Shneyerov, 2006. "Dynamic Matching with Two-sided Incomplete Information and Participation Costs," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000009, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 2006. "Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 660.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 19 Apr 2006. [Downloadable!]
  3. Sjaak Hurkensy & Nir Vulkan, 2006. "Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines," OFRC Working Papers Series 2006fe02, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  4. Abhinay Muthoo & Suresh Mutuswami, 2005. "Competition and Efficiency in Markets with Quality Uncertainty," Economics Discussion Papers 593, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Stephan Lauermann, 2008. "Price Setting in a Decentralized Market and the Competitive Outcome," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_06, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  6. Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Art, 2004. "Dynamic Matching,Two-sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition," Micro Theory Working Papers shneyerov-04-12-17-02-54-, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 17 Dec 2004. [Downloadable!]
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