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Internet auctions with many traders Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Peters,M.
Severinov,S. (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)
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Paper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number
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Date of creation: 2001Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:200111Contact details of provider: Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.
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Article Paper Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2005.
"Internet Auctions with Many Traders ,"
Micro Theory Working Papers
peters-05-03-30-03-06-03, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 23 Jan 2006.
[Downloadable!] Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 2001.
"Internet Auctions with Many Traders ,"
Working Papers
peters-01-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1990.
"Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(1), pages 63-78, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jackson, Matthew O. & Jeroen Swinkels, 2004.
"Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions ,"
Working Papers
1192, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 1997.
"Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 141-179, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2000.
"Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 499-525, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2001.
"Competition Among Auctioneers ,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
2001-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
[Downloadable!]
Dekel, E. & Wolinsky, A., 2000.
"Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions ,"
Papers
2000-13, Tel Aviv.
Other versions:
Eddie Dekel & Asher Wolinsky, 2000.
"Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First Price Discrete Auctions ,"
Discussion Papers
1308, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!] Eddie Dekel & Asher Wolinsky, 2001.
"Rationalizable outcomes of large independent private-value first-price discrete auctions ,"
Discussion Papers
1321, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!] Dekel, E. & Wolinsky, A., 2000.
"Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions ,"
Papers
00-13, Tel Aviv.
Leonard, Herman B, 1983.
"Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 461-79, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992.
"Two-sided matching ,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications ,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Peters, Michael, 1997.
"A Competitive Distribution of Auctions ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(1), pages 97-123, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Wilson, Robert B, 1985.
"Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1101-15, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
McAfee, R Preston, 1993.
"Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rustichini, Aldo & Satterthwaite, Mark A & Williams, Steven R, 1994.
"Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1041-63, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jean-Jacques Herings, P., 1997.
"A globally and universally stable price adjustment process ,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 163-193, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2000.
"Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Experiment on the Internet ,"
NBER Working Papers
7729, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Satterthwaite, Mark A & Williams, Steven R, 1989.
"The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(4), pages 477-98, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997.
"Efficient Mechanism Design ,"
Game Theory and Information
9703010, EconWPA, revised 28 Apr 1998.
[Downloadable!]
Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982.
"Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Martin W Cripps & Jeroen M Swinkels, 2003.
"Efficiency of Large Double Auctions ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
666156000000000329, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2000.
"Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1927, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Art, 2004.
"Dynamic Matching,Two-sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition ,"
Micro Theory Working Papers
shneyerov-04-12-17-02-54-, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 17 Dec 2004.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 2008.
"An ascending double auction ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 281-306, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Sascha Füllbrunn, 2007.
"Collusion or Sniping in simultaneous ascending Auctions ,"
FEMM Working Papers
07025, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
[Downloadable!]
Marta Stryszowska, 2004.
"Late and Multiple Bidding in Competing Second Price ,"
Working Papers
2004.16, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
[Downloadable!]
Mark Satterthwaite & Artyom Shneyerov, 2003.
"Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition ,"
Discussion Papers
1384, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Stanley Reynolds & John Wooders, 2009.
"Auctions with a buy price ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 9-39, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: MINGLI ZHENG & Robert McMillan & SAJID ANWAR, 2005.
"Bidding Behavior in Competing Auctions: Evidence from eBay ,"
Microeconomics
0505001, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Stryszowska, M., 2004.
"Late and multiple bidding in competing second price internet auctions ,"
Discussion Paper
43, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Art Shneyerov, 2006.
"Dynamic Matching with Two-sided Incomplete Information and Participation Costs ,"
Theory workshop papers
815595000000000009, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Axel Ockenfels, 2002.
"New Institutional Structures on the Internet: The Economic Design of Online Auctions ,"
Papers on Strategic Interaction
2002-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
[Downloadable!]
Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2002.
"Cyberspace Auctions and Pricing Issues: A Review of Empirical Findings ,"
Working Papers
02005, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Jesse A. Schwartz & Ricardo Ungo, 2003.
"Merging Auction Houses ,"
Working Papers
0303, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
[Downloadable!]
Anderson, Steven & Friedman, Daniel & Milam, Garrett & Singh, Nirvikar, 2007.
"Seller strategies on eBay: Does size matter? ,"
MPRA Paper
4324, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
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