1. Piero Gottardi & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading," Game Theory and Information 0203005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Piero Gottardi & Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   • Piero Gottardi & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading," Economics Working Papers 0027, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Piero Gottardi & Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Market Power And Information Revelation In Dynamic Trading," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(6), pages 1279-1317, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 1997. "Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 141-179, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 1995. "Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Working Papers peters-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
3. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2000. "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 499-525, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996. "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1168, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
4. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Rustichini, Aldo & Satterthwaite, Mark A & Williams, Steven R, 1994. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1041-63, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1997. "The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1247-1282, November.
   Other versions:
   • Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1995. "The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions," Discussion Papers 1147, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
7. Martin W. Cripps & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2006. "Efficiency of Large Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 47-92, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Martin W Cripps & Jeroen M Swinkels, 2003. "Efficiency of Large Double Auctions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000329, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
8. Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 2005. "An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 72(2), pages 567-592, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Gresik, Thomas A., 1991. "Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 41-63, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Krishna, Vijay, 2003. "Asymmetric English auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 261-288, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2005. "Internet Auctions with Many Traders," Micro Theory Working Papers peters-05-03-30-03-06-03, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 23 Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 2001. "Internet Auctions with Many Traders," Working Papers peters-01-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2006. "Internet auctions with many traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 220-245, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1452-1475, December. [Downloadable!]
14. Gresik, Thomas A. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1989. "The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 304-332, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Mark Satterthwaite & Artyom Shneyerov, 2003. "Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition," Discussion Papers 1384, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2003. "Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition," Micro Theory Working Papers shneyerov-03-12-17-09-36-, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 17 Dec 2003. [Downloadable!]