Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading
AbstractWe study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of uninformed buyers and a finite number of sellers, some of them informed. When there is only one seller, full information revelation never occurs in equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the first period. The outcome with n sellers depends both on the structure of sellers' information and the intensity of competition among them allowed by the market rules. We show that the latter plays an even more important role. With intense competition (absence of clienteles), information is fully and immediately revealed to the buyers in every equilibrium for n large enough, both when all sellers are informed and when only one seller is informed. On the other hand, with a less intense form of competition (presence of clienteles), collusive equilibria, where information is never revealed, also exist, whatever the number of sellers. Moreover, when only one seller is informed, for many parameter configurations there are no equilibria with full information revelation, for any n.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0203005.
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 14 Mar 2002
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Other versions of this item:
- Piero Gottardi & Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Market Power And Information Revelation In Dynamic Trading," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(6), pages 1279-1317, December.
- Piero Gottardi & Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading," CESifo Working Paper Series 1300, CESifo Group Munich.
- Piero Gottardi & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading," Economics Working Papers 0027, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-06-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2002-07-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2002-06-18 (Microeconomics)
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