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Internet Trading Mechanisms And Rational Expectations

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  • Sergei Severinov
  • Michael Peters

Abstract

This paper studies an internet trading mechanism similar to the one described in Peters and Severinov (2001) in a market where traders values are interdependent. It is shown that under reasonable conditions this mechanism has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which supports allocations that converge to rational expectations equilibrium allocations. In particular, this equilibrium supports allocations that are ex post efficient. We show how to construct the rational expectations equilibrium from the market outcome. The mechanism is also compared to a double auction

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings with number 551.

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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:nawm04:551

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Keywords: internet auctions; rational expectations;

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References

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  1. Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1998. "Efficient non-contractible investments," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 253, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  2. Piero Gottardi & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0203005, EconWPA.
  3. Aldo Rustichini, 1992. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 995, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84, January.
  5. Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 1995. "Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Working Papers peters-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  6. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
  7. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
  8. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department 452f3f87415f37596752b3995, Penn Economics Department.
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Cited by:
  1. Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2003. "Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition," Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics shneyerov-03-12-17-09-36-, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 17 Dec 2003.

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