Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions
AbstractIn this paper, we demonstrate the e¢ ciency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions. We generalize the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many on one) meetings and private information. We consider both the case in which buyers learn their valuations before visiting a seller and the case in which they learn their valuations after visiting the seller. We also allow for seller heterogeneity with respect to reservation values.
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Date of creation: 05 Jan 2013
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-06-16 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2013-06-16 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2013-06-16 (Microeconomics)
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