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Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?

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  • Philippe Jehiel
  • Laurent Lamy

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 786969000000000316.

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Date of creation: 15 Nov 2011
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000316

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  1. Patrick Bajari & Ali Horta�su, 2004. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 457-486, June.
  2. Philippe Jeniel, 2001. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0003, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  3. Hickman, Brent, 2010. "On the pricing rule in electronic auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 423-433, September.
  4. Laurent Lamy, 2013. "“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 194-214, 06.
  5. Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 247-272, May.
  6. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2010. "Strategic Thinking," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001148, David K. Levine.
  7. Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 1995. "Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Working Papers peters-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  8. Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2005. "Competition among auctioneers in large markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 107-127, March.
  9. Kevin Hasker & Robin Sickles, 2010. "eBay in the Economic Literature: Analysis of an Auction Marketplace," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 3-42, August.
  10. Yingyao Hu & Matthew Shum, 2007. "Estimating First-Price Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders: A Misclassification Approach," Economics Working Paper Archive, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics 541, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  11. Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84, January.
  12. Philippe Jehiel, 2007. "Manipulative Auction Design," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001547, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2003. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," NBER Working Papers 9889, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Lamy, Laurent, 2009. "The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 390-413, January.
  15. Alexander Matros & Wooyoung Lim & Theodore Turocy, 2009. "Raising Revenue With Raffles: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment," Working Papers, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics 377, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2009.
  16. Peters, Michael, 1997. "A Competitive Distribution of Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 97-123, January.
  17. Cai, Hongbin & Riley, John & Ye, Lixin, 2007. "Reserve price signaling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 253-268, July.
  18. Syngjoo Choi & Lars Nesheim & Imran Rasul, 2010. "Reserve price effects in auctions: estimates from multiple RD designs," CeMMAP working papers, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies CWP30/10, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  19. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
  20. Harry J. Paarsch & Han Hong, 2006. "An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262162350, December.
  21. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-99, June.
  22. Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2003. "Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 97-113, October.
  23. Tanjim Hossain, 2008. "Learning by bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 509-529.
  24. Uri Simonsohn & Dan Ariely, 2008. "When Rational Sellers Face Nonrational Buyers: Evidence from Herding on eBay," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 54(9), pages 1624-1637, September.
  25. Burguet, Roberto & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1999. "Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 231-47, February.
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