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Competition between auctions

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Author Info

  • Ernan Haruvy
  • Peter Popkowski Leszczyc

    ()

  • Octavian Carare
  • James Cox
  • Eric Greenleaf
  • Wolfgang Jank
  • Sandy Jap
  • Young-Hoon Park
  • Michael Rothkopf

Abstract

Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we review the state of the art of competition between auctions. We consider three different types of competition: competition between auctions, competition between formats, and competition between auctioneers vying for auction traffic. We highlight the newest experimental, statistical and analytical methods in the analysis of competition between auctions.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11002-008-9037-2
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Marketing Letters.

Volume (Year): 19 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 431-448

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Handle: RePEc:kap:mktlet:v:19:y:2008:i:3:p:431-448

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100312

Related research

Keywords: Auctions; Bidding; Competition; Auction formats; Auction houses;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Jason Shachat & Lijia Wei, 2012. "Procuring Commodities: First-Price Sealed-Bid or English Auctions?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 31(2), pages 317-333, March.
  2. Estelle Cantillon & Pai-Ling Yin, 2011. "Competition between Exchanges: A research Agenda," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/99386, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  3. Kevin Yili Hong & Alex Chong Wang & Paul A. Pavlou, 2013. "How does Bid Visibility Matter in Buyer-Determined Auctions? Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions in Online Labor Markets," Working Papers 13-05, NET Institute.
  4. Jason Shachat, 2013. "Procuring Commodities: First Price Sealed Bid or English Auction?," Papers 2013-10-14, Working Paper.
  5. Yongfu He & Peter Popkowski Leszczyc, 2013. "The impact of jump bidding in online auctions," Marketing Letters, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 387-397, December.
  6. Alok Gupta & Stephen Parente & Pallab Sanyal, 2012. "Competitive bidding for health insurance contracts: lessons from the online HMO auctions," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 303-322, December.

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