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Learning by bidding

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Author Info
Tanjim Hossain

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Abstract

We analyze a dynamic second-price auction with an informed bidder and an uninformed bidder who, upon seeing a posted price, learns whether his valuation is above that price. In the essentially unique equilibrium, an informed bidder bids in the first period if her valuation is below some cutoff and bids only in the last period otherwise. An uninformed bidder bids in every period to optimally change the price unless the price is above his valuation or he is the high bidder. This model also provides a rationale behind the use of a secret reserve price in private-value settings. Copyright (c) 2008, RAND.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00025.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by RAND Corporation in its journal The RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 39 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 509-529
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Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:2:p:509-529

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  1. Sascha Füllbrunn, 2009. "A comparison of Candle Auctions and Hard Close Auctions with Common Values," FEMM Working Papers 09019, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-27.

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