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Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies

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Author Info
Harold L. Cole
George J. Mailath
Andrew Postlewaite

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Abstract

Do investors making complementary investments face the correct incentives, especially when they cannot contract with each other prior to their decisions? We present a two-sided matching model in which buyers and sellers make investments prior to matching. Once matched, buyer and seller bargain over the price, taking into account outside options. Efficient decisions can always be sustained in equilibrium. We characterize the inefficiencies that can arise in equilibrium, and show that equilibria will be constrained efficient. We also show that the degree of diversity in a large market has implications for the extent of any inefficiency.

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Paper provided by University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences in its series CARESS Working Papres with number eff-inv-large.

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Date of creation: 05 Jun 2000
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Handle: RePEc:wop:pennca:eff-inv-large

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  1. Ed Hopkins, 2006. "Job Market Signalling of Relative Position, or Becker Married to Spence," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000553, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Pierre-André Chiappori & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2006. "Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market," IZA Discussion Papers 2454, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  3. Moen, Espen R. & Rosén, Åsa, 2002. "Does poaching distort training?," Working Paper Series 4/2002, Swedish Institute for Social Research. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Peters, Michael, 2004. "The Pre-Marital Investment Game," Micro Theory Working Papers peters-04-02-18-01-42-09, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 13 Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
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  5. George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000019, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Ximena Peña, 2006. "Assortative Matching and the Education Gap," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 002032, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Hoppe, Heidrun C. & Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2006. "The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals," CEPR Discussion Papers 5543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2005. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2005-001, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Olivier Charlot & Bruno Decreuse, 2006. "Over-education for the rich vs under-education for the poor: a search-theoretic microfoundation," Working Papers halshs-00409583_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  10. Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics, 2006. "The Hold-up Problem," ESE Discussion Papers 142, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  11. James W. Boudreau, 2008. "Sequential Pre-Marital Investment Games: Implications for Unemployment," Working papers 2008-45, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Helmut Bester, 2009. "Investment and the Holdup Problem in a Matching Market," Discussion Papers 263, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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