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The Central Assignment Game and the Assignment Markets

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Author Info
Mamoru Kaneko (University of Tsukuba)

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Abstract

Initially we prove the nonemptiness of the core of an n-person game without side payments called a central assignment game. Next, we provide a market model with indivisible goods but without the transferable utility assumption. Applying the first result to the market model, we prove the nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Finally, we provide a generalization of the market model and also show the nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium using the results in the previous model.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cp/p05b/p0551.pdf
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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d05b/d0563.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 563.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Oct 1980
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (1982), 10: 205-232
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:563

Note: CFP 551.
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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997. "An explicit bound on e for non-emptiness of the e-core of an arbitrary game with side payments," Working Papers mwooders-98-05, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Felli, Leonhardo & Roberts, Kevin, 2000. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Jinpeng Ma, 1998. "Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisibilities," Departmental Working Papers 199809, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Alexander Kovalenkovy & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1999. "Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 536, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Borm, P. & Hamers, H. & Hendrickx,, 2001. "Operations research games : a survey," Discussion Paper 45, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Harold Linh Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
  7. Laan, G. van der & Talman, D. & Yang, Z., 1996. "Existence of an equilibrium in a competitive economy with indivisibilities and money," Discussion Paper 35, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Martine Quinzii, 1982. "Core and Competitive Equilibria with Indivisibilities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 644, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  9. Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1998. "Efficient non-contractible investments," Staff Report 253, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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