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The Nonatomic Assignment Model

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Author Info
Gretsky, Neil E
Ostroy, Joseph M
Zame, William R

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Abstract

We formulate a model with a continuum of individuals to be assigned to a continuum of different positions which is an extension of the finite housing market version due to Shapley and Shubik. We show that optimal solutions to such a model exist and have properties similar to those established for finite models, namely, an equivalence among the following: (1) optimal solutions to the linear programming problem (and its dual) associated with the assignment model; (2) the core of the associated market game; and (3) the Walrasian equilibria of the associated market economy.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 2 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 103-27
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:2:y:1992:i:1:p:103-27

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  1. Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew, 2000. "Monotone Matching In Perfect And Imperfect Worlds," CEPR Discussion Papers 2396, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Ángel Gavilán, 2006. "Wage inequality, segregation by skill and the price of capital in an assignment model," Banco de España Working Papers 0613, Banco de España. [Downloadable!]
  3. Lones Smith & Axel Anderson, 2002. "Assortative Matching, Reputation, and the Beatles Break-Up," Game Theory and Information 0201002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ximena Peña, . "Assortative Matching and the Education Gap," Borradores de Economia 427, Banco de la Republica de Colombia. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Ivar Ekeland, 2008. "Existence, uniqueness and efficiency of equilibrium in hedonic markets with multidimenstional types," Quantitative Finance Papers 0807.3960, arXiv.org. [Downloadable!]
  6. Mitsunori Noguchi & William R. Zame, 2005. "Equilibrium Distributions with Externalities," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000543, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Axel Anderson & Lones Smith, 2006. "Assortative Matching and Reputation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1553, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  8. William Novshek & Lynda Thoman, 1993. "Agency in a market setting," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 225-253, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ramya Sundaram, 2000. "Multiple Traits in the Marriage Market: Does Diversity Sometimes Win?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1666, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  10. Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1997. "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 9711003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Konstantinos Serfes, 2008. "Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 587-619, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Joseph M. Ostroy & William R. Zame, 1991. "Non-Atomic Economies and the Boundaries of Perfect Competition," UCLA Economics Working Papers 502R, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Joon Song, 2007. "Futures Market: Contractual Arrangement to Restrain Moral Hazard in Teams," Economics Discussion Papers 633, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1998. "Efficient non-contractible investments," Staff Report 253, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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