Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

An Ascending Double Auction

Contents:

Author Info

  • Peters, Michael
  • Severinov, Sergei

Abstract

This paper studies an internet trading mechanism similar to the one described in Peters and Severinov (2000) in a market where traders values are interdependent. Conditions are given for which this mechanism has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which supports allocations that are the same as the allocations supported by a rational expectations equilibrium. In particular, this equilibrium supports allocations that are ex post efficient. We show how to construct the rational expectations equilibrium belief function from posterior beliefs at terminal information sets of the internet trading game. The mechanism is also compared to a double auction.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://montoya.econ.ubc.ca/michael_peters/information_revelation_7.pdf
File Function: Main Text
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Vancouver School of Economics in its series Microeconomics.ca working papers with number peters-03-12-16-01-57-39.

as in new window
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 16 Dec 2003
Date of revision: 26 Feb 2005
Publication status: Forthcoming in Economic Theory
Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-03-12-16-01-57-39

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.economics.ubc.ca/

Related research

Keywords: double auctions; rational expectations;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Piero Gottardi & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading," Game Theory and Information 0203005, EconWPA.
  2. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1995. "The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions," Discussion Papers 1147, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Radner, Roy, 1979. "Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 655-78, May.
  4. Peters,M. & Severinov,S., 2001. "Internet auctions with many traders," Working papers 11, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  5. Oleksii Birulin & Sergei Izmalkov, 2009. "On Effciency of the English Auction," Working Papers w0139, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  6. Rustichini, Aldo & Satterthwaite, Mark A & Williams, Steven R, 1994. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1041-63, September.
  7. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996. "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1168, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Gresik, Thomas A., 1991. "Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 41-63, October.
  9. Krishna, Vijay, 2003. "Asymmetric English auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 261-288, October.
  10. Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84, January.
  11. Gresik, Thomas A. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1989. "The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 304-332, June.
  12. Martin W. Cripps & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2006. "Efficiency of Large Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 47-92, 01.
  13. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1452-1475, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "Equilibrium blocking in large quasilinear economies," Working Papers 2009-12, Instituto MadrileƱo de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-03-12-16-01-57-39. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Maureen Chin).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.