Bidding behavior in competing auctions: Evidence from eBay
AbstractMuch of the existing auction literature treats auctions as running independently of one another, with each bidder choosing to participate in only one auction. However, in many online auctions, a number of substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently and bidders can bid on several auctions at the same time. Recent theoretical research shows how bidders can gain from the existence of competing auctions, the current paper providing the first empirical evidence in support of competing auctions theory using online auctions data from eBay. Our results indicate that a significant proportion of bidders do bid across competing auctions and that bidders tend to submit bids on auctions with the lowest standing bid, as the theory predicts. The paper also shows that winning bidders who cross-bid pay lower prices on average than winning bidders who do not.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 50 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Other versions of this item:
- MINGLI ZHENG & Robert McMillan & SAJID ANWAR, 2005. "Bidding Behavior in Competing Auctions: Evidence from eBay," Microeconomics 0505001, EconWPA.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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