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Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Nir Dagan
Roberto Serrano
Oscar Volij
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registered author(s):
We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalence results between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the case of indivisible goods.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number
178.
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Date of creation: Jun 1996Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:178Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
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Keywords: Finite coalitions ; strategic bargaining ; core ; Walrasian equilibrium ; Other versions of this item:
Paper Volij, Oscar & Serrano, Roberto & Dagan, Nir, 2002.
"Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition ,"
Staff General Research Papers
5107, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996.
"Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition ,"
Economic theory and game theory
014, Nir Dagan, revised May 1999.
[Downloadable!] Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996.
"Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition ,"
Economic theory and game theory
003, Oscar Volij, revised Jul 1998.
[Downloadable!] Find related papers by JEL classification: D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Nir Dagan, 1994.
"Recontracting and Competition ,"
Economics Working Papers
152, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 1996.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gale, Douglas M, 1986.
"Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 785-806, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gale, Douglas M, 1986.
"Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 807-18, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Serrano Roberto, 1995.
"A Market to Implement the Core ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 285-294, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997.
"Non-cooperative implementation of the core ,"
Social Choice and Welfare ,
Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hart, Sergiu & Hildenbrand, Werner & Kohlberg, Elon, 1974.
"On equilibrium allocations as distributions on the commodity space ,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 159-166, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994.
"A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985.
"Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-50, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kannai, Yakar, 1970.
"Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 38(6), pages 791-815, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005.
"Bargaining and Markets ,"
Levine's Bibliography
666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Hammond, Peter J. & Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989.
"Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 113-134, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 2000.
"Approximate Cores of Games and Economies with Clubs ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1790, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna H. Wooders, 1998.
"Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs ,"
Working Papers
mwooders-00-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1999.
"Approximate Cores Of Games And Economies With Clubs ,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
535, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 2002.
"Approximate Cores Of Games And Economies With Clubs ,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
634, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna, 2003.
"Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 87-120, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Muhamet Yildiz, 2002.
"Walrasian Bargaining ,"
Theory workshop papers
505798000000000003, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2003.
"MISTAKE IN COOPERATION:the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting ,"
Working Papers
2003-23, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2005.
"Mistakes In Cooperation: The Stochastic Stability Of Edgeworth'S Recontracting ,"
Economics Working Papers
we056332, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!] Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2003.
"Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting ,"
Economics Working Papers
0029, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
[Downloadable!] Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2008.
"Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1719-1741, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2002.
"Bargaining and Competition Revisited ,"
Working Papers
2002-14, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Roberto Serrano, 2007.
"Bargaining ,"
Working Papers
2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
[Downloadable!]
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