Contracts and Domination in Competitive Economies
AbstractA new concept of contract-based domination by coalitions for competitive economies is proposed and studied in the paper. This concept is based on the notion of (barter) contract (an elementary exchange of commodities). Here classical coalitions domination is transferred onto systems (webs) of contracts and this way implemented contractual allocations which stability properties are investigated. It is shown that suggested approach is efficiently modeling perfect competition conditions and allows to describe various known classical concepts for a perfect economy – equilibria, core, fuzzy core etc. – in pure game-theoretical terms. For non-perfect economies, in which not every contract is permissible, it may serve as one of the model primitives to refine and to solve various theoretical problems.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by New Economic Association in its journal Journal of the New Economic Association.
Volume (Year): (2011)
Issue (Month): 9 ()
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Nakhimovsky prospekt, 32, Office 1115, 117218 Moscow Russia
Phone: +7 495 7189855
Fax: +7 495 7189855
Web page: http://www.econorus.org/english.phtml
More information through EDIRC
exchange economy; contract; contractual allocation; competitive equilibrium; core;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Volij, Oscar & Serrano, Roberto, 2000.
"Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition,"
Staff General Research Papers
5107, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996. "Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition," Economic theory and game theory 014, Nir Dagan, revised May 1999.
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996. "Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition," Economic theory and game theory 003, Oscar Volij, revised Jul 1998.
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996. "Bargaining, coalitions and competition," Economics Working Papers 178, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Muhamet Yildiz, 2002.
Theory workshop papers
505798000000000003, UCLA Department of Economics.
- : Karl Vind, 1993.
"Perfect Competition or the Core,"
93-12, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Magill, Michael & Shafer, Wayne, 1991. "Incomplete markets," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: W. Hildenbrand & H. Sonnenschein (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 30, pages 1523-1614 Elsevier.
- Monique Florenzano & Valeri Marakulin, 2000. "Production Equilibria in Vector Lattices," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1396, Econometric Society.
- Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July.
- Graham, Daniel A. & Peter Jennergren, L. & Peterson, David W. & Roy Weintraub, E., 1976. "Trader-commodity parity theorems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 443-454, June.
- Gale, Douglas, 1978. "The core of a monetary economy without trust," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 456-491, December.
- Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, December.
- Marakulin, V.M., 2013. "On the Edgeworth conjecture for production economies with public goods: A contract-based approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 189-200.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexey Tcharykov).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.