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Private Information, Transferable Utility, and the Core

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  • Flåm, Sjur Didrik

    ()
    (University of Bergen, Department of Economics)

  • Koutsougeras, L.

    ()
    (School of Economics, University of Manchester,)

Abstract

Considered here are transferable-utility, coalitional production or market games, featuring differently informed players. It is assumed that personalized contracts must comply with idiosyncratic information. The setting may create two sorts of shadow prices: one for material endowments, the other for knowledge. Focus is on specific, computable solutions that are generated by such prices and belong to the private core. Solutions of that sort obtain under standard regularity assumptions.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Bergen, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 04/07.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 07 Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:bergec:2007_004

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Postal: Institutt for økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen, Postboks 7802, 5020 Bergen, Norway
Phone: (+47)55589200
Fax: (+47)55589210
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Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/en
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Keywords: exchange economy; cooperative game; transferable utility; differential information; private core; Lagrangian duality; value of information.;

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References

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  1. Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series 1686, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May.
  3. Darin Lee & Oscar Volij, 1997. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Economic theory and game theory 005, Oscar Volij.
  4. Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2001. "Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 321-332.
  5. Postlewaite, Andrew & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1974. "Disadvantageous syndicates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 324-326, November.
  6. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  7. Forges, Françoise & Minelli, Enrico, 2001. "A note on the incentive compatible core," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5452, Paris Dauphine University.
  8. Allan Muir & Nicholas C. Yannelis & Dionysius Glycopantis, 2001. "An extensive form interpretation of the private core," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 293-319.
  9. Evstigneev, I.V. & Flam, S.D., 2000. "Sharing Nonconvex Costs," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 1300, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
  10. Flam, Sjur & Owen, Guillermo & Saboya, Martha, 2005. "The not-quite non-atomic game: Non-emptiness of the core in large production games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 279-297, November.
  11. Kobayashi, Takao, 1980. "Equilibrium Contracts for Syndicates with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1635-65, November.
  12. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July.
  13. Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1991. "The Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 183-97, April.
  14. Aumann, R. J. & Peleg, B., 1974. "A note on Gale's example," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 209-211, August.
  15. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  16. Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
  17. Evstigneev, I.V. & Flam, S.D., 2000. "Stochastic Programming: Non-Anticipativity and Lagrange Multipliers," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 1100, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
  18. Aldo Rustichini & Paolo Siconolfi, 2008. "General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 1-29, October.
  19. Magill, Michael & Shafer, Wayne, 1991. "Incomplete markets," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: W. Hildenbrand & H. Sonnenschein (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 30, pages 1523-1614 Elsevier.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Didrik Flåm, Sjur, 2012. "Coupled projects, core imputations, and the CAPM," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 170-176.
  2. Sjur Didrik Flåm, 2013. "Reaching Market Equilibrium Merely by Bilateral Barters," CESifo Working Paper Series 4504, CESifo Group Munich.

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