Nir Dagan () (Academic College of Tel-Aviv-Yaffo, Tel-Aviv, ISRAEL) Oscar Volij () (Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA) Roberto Serrano () (Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
We study a Gale-like matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof makes use of the theory of the core. With respect to previous work, our positive implementation result applies to a substantially larger class of economies: the model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences, and also admits an arbitrary number of divisible and indivisible goods.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory