Non-cooperative implementation of the core

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Non-cooperative implementation of the core

Author Info

Roberto Serrano (Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA)
Rajiv Vohra (Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA)

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine the non-cooperative basis of the core. We provide mechanisms that are motivated closely by the very description of the core, and have the property that their non-cooperative equilibrium outcomes coincide with the core. For general economic environments we construct an extensive form mechanism in which each player proposes a status-quo and then also has an opportunity to recontract with any other coalition. A proposal to recontract is enforced if and only if it meets with the unanimous approval of such a coalition. We show that subgame perfect outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the core allocations of the underlying economy. We also consider situations, such as labor managed firms, in which the mechanism designer does not know the set of feasible allocations but can observe the output (utility).

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 14 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 513-525
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:4:p:513-525

Note: Received: 14 September 1994/Accepted: 16 April 1996
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Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May. [Downloadable!]
Luis C. Corchon & Matteo Triosi, 2005. "Implementation With State Dependent Feasible Sets And Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Economics Working Papers we057136, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Matteo Triossi & Luis Corchón, 2006. "Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 24, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
Chen Ying Huang & Tomas Sjostrom, 2005. "Implementation of the Recursive Core for Partition Function Form Games," Economics Working Papers 0052, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Huang, Chen-Ying & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2006. "Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 771-793, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Juan Camilo Gómez, 2003. "An Extension of the Core solution Concept," Discussion Papers 04-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Murali Agastya, 1995. "An Evolutionary Bargaining Model," Game Theory and Information 9503001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1999. "Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods," Economic theory and game theory 009, Nir Dagan. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1995. "Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods," Working Papers 95-14, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 2002. "Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods," Staff General Research Papers 5246, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Roberto Serrano, 1999. "Feasible implementation of taxation methods," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 57-72. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2004-18, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2007. "The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 144-158, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kóczy,László Á., 2005. "The Core Can Be Accessed with a Bounded Number of Blocks," Research Memoranda 042, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Laszlo.A.Koczy, 2005. "The Core Can Be Accessed with a Bounded Number of Blocks," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0512, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Koczy, Laszlo A., 2006. "The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 56-64, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Cooperative Games: Core And Shapley Value," Working Papers wp2007_0709, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value," Working Papers 2007-11, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission In Coalitional Voting Games," Economics Working Papers we055726, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Economics Working Papers 0050, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
- Rajiv Vohra & Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 519, Econometric Society.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Working Papers 2005-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2007. "Information transmission in coalitional voting games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 117-137, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1999. "Bargaining and Bargaining Sets," Working Papers 99-18, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Bargaining and Bargaining Sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 292-308, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Brennan Platt, 2009. "Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 361-381, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 301-316, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Bochet,Olivier, 2005. "Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence: The Boundary Problem," Research Memoranda 037, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
- BOCHET, Olivier, 2005. "Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem," CORE Discussion Papers 2005060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Milan Horniaček, 2008. "Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 235-249, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996. "Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition," Economics Working Papers 178, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Volij, Oscar & Serrano, Roberto & Dagan, Nir, 2002. "Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition," Staff General Research Papers 5107, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996. "Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition," Economic theory and game theory 014, Nir Dagan, revised May 1999. [Downloadable!]
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996. "Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition," Economic theory and game theory 003, Oscar Volij, revised Jul 1998. [Downloadable!]

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