Kazuya Kamiya (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo) Takashi Shimizu (Department of Economics, Kansai University)
Abstract
A conventional wisdom in economics is that a model dealing frictionless markets with a large number of agents always yields a Walrasian outcome. In this paper we assess the above argument in a dynamic framework by modeling centralized auction markets, and show that in such markets the outcomes are not necessarily Walrasian; the set of stationary equilibria in our model is a continuum which includes the Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, we also buildamodelondecentralized auction markets and obtain similar results.
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Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number
CIRJE-F-417.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Complexity and Competition,"
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Akihiko Matsui & Takashi Shimizu, 2005.
"A Theory Of Money And Marketplaces,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(1), pages 35-59, 02.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)