A Rudimentary Random-Matching Model with Divisible Money and Prices
Abstract
We consider a version of Kiyotaki and Wright's monetary search model in which agents can hold arbitrary amounts of divisible money. A continuum of stationary equilibria, indexed by the aggregate real-money stock, exist with all trading occurring at a single price. There is always a maximum level of the real money stock consistent with existence of such an equilibrium. In the limit as trading becomes faster relative to discounting, any real money stock becomes feasible in such an equilibrium. In contrast to the original Kiyotaki-Wright model, higher equilibrium real money stocks unambiguously correspond to higher welfare.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 81 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 252-271
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Edward J. Green & Ruilin Zhou, 1996. "A Rudimentary Random-Matching Model with Divisible Money and Prices," GE, Growth, Math methods 9606001, EconWPA, revised 25 Jul 1996.
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Shouyong Shi, 1995.
"Money and Prices: A Model of Search and Bargaining,"
Working Papers
916, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Shi Shougong, 1995. "Money and Prices: A Model of Search and Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 467-496, December.
- S. Rao Aiyagari & Neil Wallace & Randall Wright, 1996.
"Coexistence of money and interest-bearing securities,"
Working Papers
550, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Rao Aiyagari, S. & Wallace, Neil & Wright, Randall, 1996. "Coexistence of money and interest-bearing securities," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 397-419, June.
- Diamond, Peter & Yellin, Joel, 1990. "Inventories and Money Holdings in a Search Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 929-50, July.
- William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
- Trejos, Alberto & Wright, Randall, 1995. "Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 118-41, February.
- Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, August.
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