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Evolutionary Rent-Seeking

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  • Burkhard Hehenkamp
  • Wolfgang Leininger
  • Alex Possajennikov

Abstract

Tullock’s analysis of rent-seeking is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionarily stable behavior in a rent-seeking contest differs from efficient rent-seeking behavior in a Nash equilibrium. We explore that implications of evolutionary stability for rent-seeking behavior and relate them to the well examined Nash equilibrium behavior. A most interesting result is an overdissipation law, which holds in evolutionary equilibrium.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2001/wp-cesifo-2001-12/cesifo_wp620.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 620.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_620

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  1. Schoonbeek, L. & Kooreman, P., 1997. "The specification of the probability functions in Tullock's rentseeking contest," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-377560, Tilburg University.
  2. Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Wolfgang Leininger, 2002. "Contests over Public Goods: Evolutionary Stability and the Free-Rider Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 713, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Carlos Alós Ferrer & Ana B. Ania, 2002. "The Evolutionary Logic of Feeling Small," Vienna Economics Papers, University of Vienna, Department of Economics 0216, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  3. Burkhard Schipper, 2002. "Submodularity and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse4_2003, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

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