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Group Selection: The quest for social preferences

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Author Info
Salomonsson, Marcus () (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)
Abstract

This paper surveys the literature on group selection. I describe the early contributions and the group selection controversy. I also describe the main approaches to group selection in the recent literature; fixation, assortative group formation, and reproductive externalities.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 712.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 06 Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0712

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Related research
Keywords: Altruism; spite; externalities; conformity; fixation; signalling;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2002. "Local Conventions," Discussion Papers 1349, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2002. "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 67-88, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Vega-Redondo Fernando, 1993. "Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of Equilibrium Selection: A Simple Example," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 618-631, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1042, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. José Canals & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1998. "Multi-level evolution in population games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 21-35. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Oechssler, Jorg, 1997. "Decentralization and the coordination problem," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 119-135, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Boyer, Robert & Orlean, Andre, 1992. "How Do Conventions Evolve?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 165-77, October.
  9. Sjostrom, Tomas & Weitzman, Martin L., 1996. "Competition and the evolution of efficiency," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 25-43, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Eshel, Ilan & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 1998. "Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 157-79, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Dawes, Robyn M & Thaler, Richard H, 1988. "Anomalies: Cooperation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 187-97, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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