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No imitation - on local and group interaction, learning and reciprocity in prisoners\

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  • Kirchkamp, Oliver

    (Sonderforschungsbereich 504)

  • Nagel, Rosemarie

    (Dep.of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

Abstract

This study disentangles experimentally imitation, reinforcement, and reciprocity in repeated prisoners' dilemmas. We compare a simple situation in which players interact only with their neighbours (local interaction) with one where players interact with all members of the population (group interaction). We observe choices under different information conditions and estimate parameters of a learning model. We find that imitation, while assumed to be a driving force in many models of spatial evolution, is often a negligible factor in the experiment. Behaviour is predominantly driven by reinforcement learning.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirchkamp, Oliver & Nagel, Rosemarie, 2003. "No imitation - on local and group interaction, learning and reciprocity in prisoners\," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 03-04, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    • Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:03-04
    Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim and the Spanish DGIC Tecnica PB95-0983is gratefully acknowledged.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
    2. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-881, September.
    3. Eshel, I. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A., 1996. "Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," Working papers 9612, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    4. Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1999. "Simultaneous evolution of learning rules and strategies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 295-312, November.
    5. Ilan Eshel & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, "undated". "Altruists Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," ELSE working papers 005, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    6. Eshel, Ilan & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 1998. "Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 157-179, March.
    7. Antoni Bosch-DomËnech & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2003. "Imitation of successful behaviour in cournot markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(487), pages 495-524, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kene Boun My & Alban Verchere & Stephane Bertrand, 2009. "Does Bilateralism Foster Co‐operation in Europe? An Experimental Approach of Comparative Merits of Bilateralism and Multilateralism," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 891-910, September.
    2. Kene Boun My & Alban Verchere & Stephane Bertrand, 2009. "Does Bilateralism Foster Co‐operation in Europe? An Experimental Approach of Comparative Merits of Bilateralism and Multilateralism," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 891-910, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Local interaction; experiments; prisoner's dilemma; learning; reinforcement; repeated games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)

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