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Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoners' Dilemma

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Author Info
Oliver Kirchkamp (University of Bonn)

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Abstract

The paper applies the idea of evolution to a spatial model. We assume that the prisoners' dilemma is played only within a neighborhood and that evolutionary pressure works also only on a local level. Discriminatory behavior of players is introduced representing strategies as small automata, identical for a player but possibly in different states against different neighbors. Extensive simulations show that success among surviving strategies may differ and that in contrast to undiscriminative behavior cooperation persists even in a stochastic environment. Keywords: Evolutionary Game Theory, Networks, Prisoners' Dilemma, Overlapping Generations. JEL-Code: C63, C73, D62, D83, R12, R13.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9403003.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 09 Mar 1994
Date of revision: 18 May 1994
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9403003

Note: 37 pages, postscript, also available as http://witch.econ3.uni-bonn.de/~oliver/spatEvol.shtml. Hardcopy requests to kirchkamp@witch.econ3.uni-bonn.de
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
  2. repec:att:wimass:199612r is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Schelling, Thomas C, 1969. "Models of Segregation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 488-93, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Stanley, E.A. & Ashlock, D. & Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 2004. "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners," Staff General Research Papers 11180, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1996. "Simultaneous Evolution of Learning Rules and Strategies," Discussion Paper Serie B 379, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Robert Hoffmann, 2001. "Social Cognition in the Evolutionary Chicken Game," Occasional Papers 1, Nottingham University Business School, revised 10 Apr 2001. [Downloadable!]
  3. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Haller, Hans & Outkin, Alexander, 2005. "Neural Networks and Contagion," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 05-35, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  4. M.G. Zimmermann, V. M. Eguiluz, 2001. "Evolution of Cooperative Networks and the Emergence of Leadership," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 171, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Oliver Kirchkamp, 1995. "Asynchronous Evolution of Pairs - How spatial evolution leads to inequality," Game Theory and Information 9510004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Jurjen Kamphorst & Gerard van der Laan, 2006. "Learning in a Local Interaction Hawk-Dove Game," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-034/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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