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Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game

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Author Info
Joëlle Noailly (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)
Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh (Free University)
Cees A. Withagen (Free University and Tilburg University)

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Abstract

Conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game are studied. This combines in a unique way local and global interactions. A fixed number of harvesters are located on a spatial grid. Harvesters choose among three strategies: defection, cooperation, and enforcement. Individual payoffs are affected by both global factors, namely, aggregate harvest and resource stock level, and local factors, such as the imposition of sanctions on neighbors by enforcers. The evolution of strategies in the population is driven by social learning through imitation. Numerous types of equilibria exist in these settings. An important new finding is that clusters of cooperators and enforcers can survive among large groups of defectors. We discuss how the results contrast with the non-spatial, but otherwise similar, game of Sethi and Somanathan (1996).

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2005.78.

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Date of creation: May 2005
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.78

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Related research
Keywords: Common property; Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Global interactions; Local interactions; Social norms;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-88, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hackett Steven & Schlager Edella & Walker James, 1994. "The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 99-126, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Joëlle Noailly & Cees Withagen & Jeroen Bergh, 2007. "Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(1), pages 113-141, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. M.A. Nowak & K. Sigmund, 1999. "Games on Grids," Working Papers ir99038, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  5. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Nagel, Rosemarie, 2007. "Naive learning and cooperation in network experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 269-292, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh & Giorgos Kallis, 2009. "Evolutionary Policy," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2009-02, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group. [Downloadable!]
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