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Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game

Author

Listed:
  • Joëlle Noailly

    (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)

  • Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh

    (Free University)

  • Cees A. Withagen

    (Free University and Tilburg University)

Abstract

Conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game are studied. This combines in a unique way local and global interactions. A fixed number of harvesters are located on a spatial grid. Harvesters choose among three strategies: defection, cooperation, and enforcement. Individual payoffs are affected by both global factors, namely, aggregate harvest and resource stock level, and local factors, such as the imposition of sanctions on neighbors by enforcers. The evolution of strategies in the population is driven by social learning through imitation. Numerous types of equilibria exist in these settings. An important new finding is that clusters of cooperators and enforcers can survive among large groups of defectors. We discuss how the results contrast with the non-spatial, but otherwise similar, game of Sethi and Somanathan (1996).

Suggested Citation

  • Joëlle Noailly & Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh & Cees A. Withagen, 2005. "Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game," Working Papers 2005.78, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.78
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    Cited by:

    1. Petrohilos-Andrianos, Yannis & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 2017. "Resource harvesting regulation and enforcement: An evolutionary approach," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 236-253.
    2. Emilie Lindkvist & Xavier Basurto & Maja Schlüter, 2017. "Micro-level explanations for emergent patterns of self-governance arrangements in small-scale fisheries—A modeling approach," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(4), pages 1-23, April.
    3. Karolina Safarzyńska & Jeroen Bergh, 2010. "Evolutionary models in economics: a survey of methods and building blocks," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 329-373, June.
    4. Joëlle Noailly & Cees Withagen & Jeroen Bergh, 2007. "Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(1), pages 113-141, January.
    5. Ludo Waltman & Nees Eck & Rommert Dekker & Uzay Kaymak, 2013. "An Evolutionary Model of Price Competition Among Spatially Distributed Firms," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 42(4), pages 373-391, December.
    6. Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo & Gómez, Santiago & Mantilla, César, 2019. "Between-group competition enhances cooperation in resource appropriation games," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 17-26.
    7. Bezin, Emeline & Ponthière, Gregory, 2019. "The tragedy of the commons and socialization: Theory and policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    8. van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M. & Gowdy, John M., 2009. "A group selection perspective on economic behavior, institutions and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 1-20, October.
    9. Schauf, Andrew & Oh, Poong, 2021. "Myopic reallocation of extraction improves collective outcomes in networked common-pool resource games," SocArXiv w2cxp, Center for Open Science.
    10. Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh & Giorgos Kallis, 2009. "Evolutionary Policy," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2009-02, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    11. Waring, Timothy M. & Goff, Sandra H. & Smaldino, Paul E., 2017. "The coevolution of economic institutions and sustainable consumption via cultural group selection," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 524-532.
    12. Jean-Philippe Atzenhoffer, 2012. "Could free-riders promote cooperation in the commons?," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(1), pages 85-101, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Common property; Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Global interactions; Local interactions; Social norms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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