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Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions

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  • Tarui, Nori
  • Mason, Charles F.
  • Polasky, Stephen
  • Ellis, Greg

Abstract

We model a dynamic common property resource game with unobservable actions and non-linear stock dependent costs. We propose a strategy profile that generates a worst perfect equilibrium in the punishment phase, thereby supporting cooperation under the widest set of conditions. We show under what set of parameter values for the discount rate, resource growth rate, harvest price, and the number of resource users, this strategy supports cooperation in the commons as a subgame perfect equilibrium. The strategy profile that we propose, which involves harsh punishment after a defection followed by forgiveness, is consistent with human behavior observed in experiments and common property resource case studies.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 55 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 37-51

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:55:y:2008:i:1:p:37-51

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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Cited by:
  1. Finus, Michael & Lindroos, Marko & Munro, Gordon & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2008. "Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers, University of Stirling, Division of Economics 2008-11, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
  2. Kotchen, Matthew J. & Salant, Stephen W., 2011. "A free lunch in the commons," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 245-253, May.
  3. Alessandro Tavoni & Maja Schlüter & Simon Levin, 2011. "The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management," Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Papers, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment 35, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
  4. Emilio Calvo & Santiago J. Rubio, 2012. "Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour, University of Valencia, ERI-CES 0112, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
  5. Christos Koulovatianos & Elena Antoniadou & Leonard J.Mirman, 2007. "Strategic Exploitation of a Common-Property Resource under Uncertainty," Vienna Economics Papers, University of Vienna, Department of Economics 0703, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  6. Blanco, Ester & Lozano, Javier & Rey-Maquieira, Javier, 2009. "A dynamic approach to voluntary environmental contributions in tourism," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 104-114, November.
  7. Michael Finus & Raoul Schneider & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2011. "The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries," Discussion Papers, Exeter University, Department of Economics 1103, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  8. Finus, Michael & Schneider, Raoul, 2012. "Scope and Compatibility of Measures in International Fisheries Agreements," Department of Economics Working Papers, University of Bath, Department of Economics 28486, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
  9. Encarna Esteban & Ariel Dinar, 2013. "Cooperative Management of Groundwater Resources in the Presence of Environmental Externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 54(3), pages 443-469, March.
  10. Patel, Amrish & Cartwright, Edward & Mark, Van Vugt, 2010. "Punishment Cannot Sustain Cooperation in a Public Good Game with Free-Rider Anonymity," Working Papers in Economics, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics 451, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  11. Steven J. Lade & Alessandro Tavoni & Simon A. Levin & Maja Schlüter, 2013. "Regime shifts in a social-ecological system," Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Papers, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment 105, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.

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