The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries
AbstractWe argue that international fisheries are a prime example to study the impact of multiple characteristics on the incentive structure of impure public good provision. The degree of technical excludability is related to the pattern of fish migration, the degree of socially constructed excludability is captured by the design of international law and the degree of rivalry is reflected by the growth rate of the resource. We construct a bioeconomic model, including the high seas and exclusive economic zones in order to study the incentives to form stable fully or partially cooperative agreements. We show that the spatial allocation of property rights is crucial for the success of cooperation as long as technical excludability is sufficiently high. Moreover, we show how economic and ecological factors influence the success of cooperation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Exeter University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 1103.
Date of creation: 2011
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pure and impure public goods; technical and socially constructed nonexcludability; property rights; coalition formation; free-riding; bioeconomic model; shared fish stocks; regional fisheries management organizations.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-03-19 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2011-03-19 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2011-03-19 (Public Economics)
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