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The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries

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Author Info

  • Michael Finus

    (Department of Economics, University of Exeter)

  • Raoul Schneider

    (Department of Economics, Ulm University)

  • Pedro Pintassilgo

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Algarve)

Abstract

We argue that international fisheries are a prime example to study the impact of multiple characteristics on the incentive structure of impure public good provision. The degree of technical excludability is related to the pattern of fish migration, the degree of socially constructed excludability is captured by the design of international law and the degree of rivalry is reflected by the growth rate of the resource. We construct a bioeconomic model, including the high seas and exclusive economic zones in order to study the incentives to form stable fully or partially cooperative agreements. We show that the spatial allocation of property rights is crucial for the success of cooperation as long as technical excludability is sufficiently high. Moreover, we show how economic and ecological factors influence the success of cooperation.

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File URL: http://people.exeter.ac.uk/cc371/RePEc/dpapers/DP1103.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Exeter University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 1103.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:exe:wpaper:1103

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Keywords: pure and impure public goods; technical and socially constructed nonexcludability; property rights; coalition formation; free-riding; bioeconomic model; shared fish stocks; regional fisheries management organizations.;

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References

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  1. Michael Finus & Pedro Pintassilgo & Marko Lindroos & Gordon Munro, 2008. "Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations," Working Papers 2008.20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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Cited by:
  1. Finus, Michael & Schneider, Raoul, 2012. "Scope and Compatibility of Measures in International Fisheries Agreements," Department of Economics Working Papers 28486, University of Bath, Department of Economics.

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