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Health-promoting alliances

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  • Arce M., Daniel G.
  • Sandler, Todd

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 19 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 355-375

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:19:y:2003:i:2:p:355-375

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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References

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  1. Dani Rodrik, 1997. "Has Globalization Gone Too Far?," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 57, July.
  2. Arce M., Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2001. "Transnational public goods: strategies and institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 493-516, September.
  3. Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185.
  4. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler, 2001. "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 869-896, September.
  5. Arce M, Daniel G & Sandler, Todd, 2001. " A Cooperative Game Theory of Noncontiguous Allies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 391-411.
  6. Vicary, Simon & Sandler, Todd, 2002. "Weakest-link public goods: Giving in-kind or transferring money," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1501-1520, September.
  7. Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
  8. Maschler, M. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1992. "The general nucleolus and the reduced game property," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154217, Tilburg University.
  9. Maschler, M & Potters, J A M & Tijs, S H, 1992. "The General Nucleolus and the Reduced Game Property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 85-106.
  10. Sandler, Todd & Lapan, Harvey E., 1988. "The Calculus of Dissent: An Analysis of Terrorists' Choice of Targets," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 10818, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2004. "An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2004.155, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2009. "Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 389-406, March.
  3. Michael Finus & Raoul Schneider & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2011. "The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries," Discussion Papers, Exeter University, Department of Economics 1103, Exeter University, Department of Economics.

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