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Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

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Author Info
Finus, Michael
Lindroos, Marko
Munro, Gordon
Pintassilgo, Pedro

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Abstract

According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. It is shown that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher are the relative gains from full cooperation, but the lower is the likelihood of large RFMOs being stable. Moreover, the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of production cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/510
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Paper provided by University of Stirling, Department of Economics in its series Stirling Economics Discussion Papers with number 2008-11.

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Date of creation: Jun 2008
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Handle: RePEc:stl:stledp:2008-11

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Related research
Keywords: straddling fish stock; regional fisheries management organizations; unregulated fishing; bioeconomic model; coalition formation model; free-riding;

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  1. Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2006. "An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities Forming Coalitions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(3), pages 169-194, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Claude, et al d'Aspremont, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Haeringer, Guillaume, 2004. "Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 140-143, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Carlo Carraro & Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2006_44, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Ruseski, Gorazd, 1998. "International Fish Wars: The Strategic Roles for Fleet Licensing and Effort Subsidies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 70-88, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Oh Kwon, 2006. "Partial International Coordination in the Great Fish War," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 33(4), pages 463-483, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hannesson, Rognvaldur, 1997. "Fishing as a Supergame," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 309-322, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Pham Do, K.H. & Folmer, H., 2003. "International fisheries agreements: the feasibility and impacts of partial cooperation," Discussion Paper 52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  10. Clark, Colin W. & Munro, Gordon R., 1975. "The economics of fishing and modern capital theory: A simplified approach," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 92-106, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2004. "An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0414, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment. [Downloadable!]
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