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Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

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  • Pedro Pintassilgo

    ()

  • Michael Finus
  • Marko Lindroos
  • Gordon Munro

Abstract

According to international law, straddling fish stocks should preferably be managed cooperatively through regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. A comprehensive analysis of the economic and biological fundamentals that influence the success of coalition formation is provided. The results show that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher would be the relative gains from full cooperation, but the lower is the likelihood of large RFMOs being stable. It is also shown that the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of production cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 46 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 377-402

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Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:46:y:2010:i:3:p:377-402

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263

Related research

Keywords: Bioeconomic model; Coalition formation model; Free-riding; Regional fisheries management organizations; Straddling fish stock; Unregulated fishing; C72; Q22;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Breton, Michèle & Keoula, Michel Yevenunye, 2014. "A great fish war model with asymmetric players," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 209-223.
  2. Meißner, Nathalie, 2013. "The incentives of private companies to invest in protected area certificates: How coalitions can improve ecosystem sustainability," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 148-158.
  3. Michèle Breton & Michel Keoula, 2012. "Farsightedness in a Coalitional Great Fish War," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 51(2), pages 297-315, February.
  4. Michael Finus & Raoul Schneider & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2011. "The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries," Discussion Papers 1103, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  5. Michael Finus & Dirk Rübbelke, 2013. "Public Good Provision and Ancillary Benefits: The Case of Climate Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 211-226, October.

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