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An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities forming Coalitions

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Author Info
Lone Grønbæk Kronbak () (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark)
Marko Lindroos () (Department of Economics and Management, University of Helsinki)

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Abstract

The paper sets up a four-stage enforcement model of fish quotas. The purpose of the paper is to show how the level of enforcement set by the authorities af-fects the way fishermen form coalitions. We show that a high level of control effort yields less cooperation among fishermen, while in the case of low control effort, coalitions are somewhat self-enforcing. The paper further discusses how the optimal enforcement level changes when the coalition formation among au-thorities changes: centralised, partly centralised and decentralised authorities. We show that decentralised authorities set a lower level of control effort com-pared to the centralised authorities. The theoretical results are illustrated by simulations of the Baltic Sea cod fishery.

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File URL: http://www.sdu.dk/~/media/Files/Om_SDU/Institutter/Miljo/ime/wp/kronbak50.ashx
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2003-12
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics in its series Working Papers with number 50/03.

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Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sdk:wpaper:50

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Related research
Keywords: Coalition formation; Fisheries management; Quota enforcement; Self-enforcing policy;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Lone Grønbæk Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2003. "An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities forming Coalitions," Working Papers 50/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2002. "A Principal-Agent Analysis of Fisheries," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(2), pages 276-, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Ruseski, Gorazd, 1998. "International Fish Wars: The Strategic Roles for Fleet Licensing and Effort Subsidies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 70-88, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lone Grønbæk Kronbak, 2002. "The Dynamics of an Open Access: The case of the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery - A Strategic Approach -," Working Papers 31/02, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hannesson, Rognvaldur, 1997. "Fishing as a Supergame," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 309-322, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Caplan, Arthur J. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 1999. "Federal Acid Rain Games," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 25-52, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2006. "An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities Forming Coalitions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(3), pages 169-194, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Kronbak, Lone Gronbaek & Lindroos, Marko, 2007. "Sharing Rules and Stability in Coalition Games with Externalities," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 22(2). [Downloadable!]
  3. Michael Finus & Pedro Pintassilgo & Marko Lindroos & Gordon Munro, 2008. "Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations," Working Papers 2008.20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Lone Grønbæk Kronbak, 2004. "A Coalition Game of the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery," Working Papers 55/04, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
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