Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries
AbstractAlmost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous countries to study the endogenous choice of a minimum participation rule and its role for the success of international environmental agreeme
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2009-077.
Date of creation: 25 Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Minimum participation rules; international environmental agreements; coalition formation; transboundary pollution; environmental policy coordination;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-10-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-10-10 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENV-2009-10-10 (Environmental Economics)
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- Leo Wangler & JJuan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2011. "The Political Economy of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-038, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
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