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Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance

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Author Info
David McEvoy ()
John Stranlund ()

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10640-008-9220-1
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Publisher Info
Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 42 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Pages: 491-508
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Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:42:y:2009:i:4:p:491-508

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263

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Related research
Keywords: International environmental agreements; Self-enforcing agreements; Compliance; Monitoring; Q5; H41; C72; F53;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Barrett, Scott, 1998. "Political Economy of the Kyoto Protocol," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 20-39, Winter.
  3. Keohane, Robert O, 1986. "Reciprocity in International Relations," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 40(1), pages 1-27, Winter.
  4. Henk Folmer & Pierre Mouche & Shannon Ragland, 1993. "Interconnected games and international environmental problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 313-335, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Downs, George W. & Rocke, David M. & Barsoom, Peter N., 1996. "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(03), pages 379-406, June. [Downloadable!]
  6. Claude, et al d'Aspremont, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Keohane, Robert O., 1986. "Reciprocity in international relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(01), pages 1-27, December. [Downloadable!]
  8. Oran R. Young, 2003. "Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 145-147, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Scott Barret, 1998. "On the Theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-Making," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 317-333, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1994. "Accuracy in the Determination of Liability," NBER Working Papers 4203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 1995. "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 279-293, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Sonia Oreffice, 2003. "Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties," Working Papers 2003.113, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Working Papers 886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Wagner, Ulrich J, 2001. " The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements: Economic Theory and Political Economy," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(3), pages 377-411, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Barrett, Scott, 1997. "The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 345-361, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Erik Ansink, 2009. "Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation," Working Papers 2009.73, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  2. David M. McEvoy & James J. Murphy & John M. Spraggon & John K. Stranlund, 2008. "The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 08-10, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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