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Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics David McEvoy ()
John Stranlund ()
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Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics .
Volume (Year): 42 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Pages: 491-508
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Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:42:y:2009:i:4:p:491-508Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263
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Keywords: International environmental agreements ; Self-enforcing agreements ; Compliance ; Monitoring ; Q5 ; H41 ; C72 ; F53 ; References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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[Downloadable!] Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Sonia Oreffice, 2003.
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Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen & Oreffice, Sonia, 2004.
"Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4281, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Sonia Oreffice, 2009.
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Erik Ansink, 2009.
"Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation ,"
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2009.73, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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David M. McEvoy & James J. Murphy & John M. Spraggon & John K. Stranlund, 2008.
"The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence ,"
Working Papers
08-10, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
[Downloadable!]
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