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Pure Public Goods versus Commons: Benefit-Cost Duality

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  • Todd Sandler
  • Daniel G. Arce M.

Abstract

This paper utilizes benefit-cost duality to differentiate the problems associated with a pure public good from the problems associated with a commons. For the public good scenario, contributors’ benefits are public or available to all, while provision costs impact only the contributor. In a commons, crowding costs are public, while benefits affect only the user. Although both problems possess the same game form for their canonical representations, collective-action implications differ: for example, the relative positions of the Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimum, the form of the exploitation hypothesis, and the need for selective incentives or punishments.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Land Economics.

Volume (Year): 79 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 355-368

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Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:79:y:2003:i:3:p:355-368

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Web page: http://le.uwpress.org/

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Cited by:
  1. Paul J. Ferraro & Michael K. Price, 2013. "Using Nonpecuniary Strategies to Influence Behavior: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(1), pages 64-73, March.
  2. Bardhan, Pranab & Ghatak, Maitreesh & Karaivanov, Alexander, 2007. "Wealth inequality and collective action," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1843-1874, September.
  3. Frank P. Maier-Rigaud & Jose Apesteguia, 2004. "The Role of Rivalry. Public Goods versus Common-Pool Resources," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004_2, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  4. Robert H. Hicks & Alan C. Haynie & Kurt E. Schnier, 2008. "Common Property, Information, and Cooperation: Commercial Fishing in the Bering Sea," Working Papers 80, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
  5. Edgardo Barandiarán, 2003. "Protecting Property from Stationary Bandits," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 40(121), pages 626-632.
  6. Michael Finus & Raoul Schneider & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2011. "The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries," Discussion Papers 1103, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  7. Runge, C. Ford, 2004. "Sustainability And Enclosure: Land, Intellectual Property And Biotechnology," Working Papers 14464, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy.
  8. Kate Ivanova, 2007. "Corruption, illegal trade and compliance with the Montreal Protocol," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(4), pages 475-496, December.

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