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Farsightedness in a Coalitional Great Fish War

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  • Michèle Breton
  • Michel Keoula

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  • Michèle Breton & Michel Keoula, 2012. "Farsightedness in a Coalitional Great Fish War," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 51(2), pages 297-315, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:51:y:2012:i:2:p:297-315
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-011-9501-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2018. "International Environmental Agreements—The Role of Foresight," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(1), pages 241-257, September.
    2. Michael Finus & Alejandro Caparrós (ed.), 2015. "Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15345.
    3. Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2005. "Stable cartels revisited," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 907-921, November.
    4. Johan Eyckmans, 2001. "On the farsighted stability of the Kyoto Protocol," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0103, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    5. Pedro Pintassilgo & Michael Finus & Marko Lindroos & Gordon Munro, 2010. "Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(3), pages 377-402, July.
    6. Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra, 1998. "Coalitional Power and Public Goods," Working Papers 98-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    7. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    8. Carlo Carraro (ed.), 2003. "The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2999.
    9. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    10. Veijo Kaitala & Marko Lindroos, 2007. "Game Theoretic Applications to Fisheries," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Andres Weintraub & Carlos Romero & Trond Bjørndal & Rafael Epstein & Jaime Miranda (ed.), Handbook Of Operations Research In Natural Resources, chapter 0, pages 201-215, Springer.
    11. Marko Lindroos, 2004. "Sharing The Benefits Of Cooperation In The Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring Fishery," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 6(01), pages 35-53.
    12. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Coalitional Power and Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(6), pages 1355-1384, December.
    13. Oh Kwon, 2006. "Partial International Coordination in the Great Fish War," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 33(4), pages 463-483, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2017. "On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 360-385, September.
    2. Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel & Rajani Singh, 2020. "When Inaccuracies in Value Functions Do Not Propagate on Optima and Equilibria," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(7), pages 1-25, July.
    3. Dahmouni, Ilyass & Sumaila, Rashid U., 2023. "A dynamic game model for no-take marine reserves," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 481(C).
    4. Florian K. Diekert & Emmi Nieminen, 2017. "International Fisheries Agreements with a Shifting Stock," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 185-211, June.
    5. Adam N. Walker & Hans-Peter Weikard & Andries Richter, 2015. "The Rise and Fall of the Great Fish Pact under Endogenous Risk of Stock Collapse," Working Papers 2015.60, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    6. Hassan Benchekroun & Amrita Ray Chaudhuri, 2015. "Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(6), pages 887-915, December.
    7. Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.
    8. Pedro Pintassilgo & Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2015. "International Fisheries Agreements: A Game Theoretical Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 689-709, December.
    9. Breton, Michèle & Keoula, Michel Yevenunye, 2014. "A great fish war model with asymmetric players," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 209-223.
    10. Kuzyutin, Denis & Smirnova, Nadezhda, 2023. "A dynamic multicriteria game of renewable resource extraction with environmentally concerned players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).

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