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International Environmental Agreements with Mixed Strategies and Investment

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  • Hong, Fuhai
  • Karp, Larry

Abstract

We modify a canonical participation game used to study International Environmental Agreements (IEA), considering both mixed and pure strategies at the participation stage, and including a prior cost-reducing investment stage. The use of mixed strategies at the participation stage reverses a familiar result and alsoreverses the policy implication of that result: with mixed strategies, equilibriumparticipation and welfare is higher in equilibria that involve higher investment.

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Paper provided by Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley in its series Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series with number qt0xf976x1.

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Date of creation: 08 May 2012
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt0xf976x1

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Keywords: Life Sciences; Social and Behavioral Sciences; International Environmental Agreement; climate agreement; participation games; investment; mixed strategy;

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Cited by:
  1. Karp, Larry & Simon, Leo, 2012. "Participation Games and international environmental agreements: a nonparametric model," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt5693n1nf, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  2. Johan Eyckmans & Sam Fankhauser & Snorre Kverndokk, 2013. "Equity, Development Aid and Climate Finance," Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Papers 123, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.

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