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Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics DRITAN OSMANI
RICHARD TOL
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The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-benefit payoff functions of pollution abatement for sixteen different world regions. The farsighted stability concept of Chwe (1994) is used and solved by combinatorial algorithms. Farsighted stability assumes perfect foresight of the players and predicts which coalitions can be formed when players are farsighted. All farsightedly stable coalitions are found, and their improvement to environment and welfare is considerable. The farsightedly stable coalitions are refined further to preferred farsightedly stable coalitions, which are coalitions where the majority of coalition members reach higher profits in comparison with any other farsightedly stable coalitions. Farsightedly stable coalitions contribute more to the improvement of environment and welfare in comparison to D'Aspremont et al.'s (1983) stable ones. Considering multiple farsighted stable coalitions, participation in coalitions for environmental protection is significantly increased, which is an optimistic result of our game theoretical model. Copyright © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
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Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory .
Volume (Year): 11 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
Pages: 455-492
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:11:y:2009:i:3:p:455-492Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923
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Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2008.
"Evolution in time of Farsightedly Stable Coalitions: An Application of FUND ,"
Working Papers
FNU-162, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2008.
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Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007.
"A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions ,"
Working Papers
FNU-150, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007.
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Other versions: Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007.
"Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two ,"
Working Papers
FNU-149, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007.
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