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A Short Note on Joint Welfare Maximization Assumption

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  • Dritan Osmani
  • Richard S J Tol

Abstract

Non-cooperative game theoretical models of International Environmental Agreements (lEAs) use the assumption that coalition of signatories maximizes their joint welfare. In this paper, the joint maximization assumption is compared to different welfare sharing schemes such as Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and consensus value. The results show that the joint welfare maximization assumption is similar to the Nash bargaining solution.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by IUP Publications in its journal The IUP Journal of Managerial Economics.

Volume (Year): VI (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 22-39

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Handle: RePEc:icf:icfjme:v:06:y:2008:i:3:p:22-39

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References

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  1. Ioannidis, Alexis & Papandreou, Andreas & Sartzetakis, Eftichios, 2000. "International Environmental Agreements: a Literature Review," Cahiers de recherche 0008, GREEN.
  2. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, . "International Environmental Agreements -The Role of Foresight," Economics Working Papers 2002-10, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  3. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June.
  4. Carraro, Carlo & Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael, 2005. "Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 5046, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Dritan Osmani & Richard Tol, 2009. "Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(3), pages 455-492, 06.
  6. Henry, TULKENS & Parkash, CHANDER, 2006. "Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in interational environmental agreements : a conceptual discussion," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006003, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques, revised 15 Jan 2006.
  7. Johan Eyckmans, 2001. "On the farsighted stability of the Kyoto Protocol," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0103, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
  8. Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1158, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Tol, Richard S. J., 2001. "Equitable cost-benefit analysis of climate change policies," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 71-85, January.
  10. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2005. "The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection," Working Papers FNU-82, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2006.
  11. Asheim, Geir B. & Froyn, Camilla Bretteville & Hovi, Jon & Menz, Fredric C., 2006. "Regional versus global cooperation for climate control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 93-109, January.
  12. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios Sartzetakis, 2002. "Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach," Others 0201001, EconWPA.
  13. CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1995. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," CORE Discussion Papers 1995050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
  15. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007. "Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two," Working Papers FNU-149, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007.
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Cited by:
  1. Dritan Osmani, . "A note on optimal transfer schemes, stable coalition for environmental protection and joint maximization assumption," Working Papers FNU-176, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University.

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