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Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two

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Author Info
Dritan Osmani
Richard S.J. Tol () (Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland)

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Abstract

We investigate the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) by applying game theory. The paper extends further our previous research on farsightedly stable coalitions and preferred farsightedly stable coalitions (Osmani & Tol 2007). The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-bene¯t payo® functions of pollution abatement for sixteen di®erent world regions. The stability concept of d'Aspremont et al. (1983) and farsighted stability of Chwe (1994) are compared. The d'Aspremont stability assumes that players are myopic while the farsighted stability concept captures the perfect foresight of the players and predicts which coalitions can be formed when players are farsighted. All farsightedly stable and D'Aspremont stable coalitions are found and their improvement to environment and welfare are computed.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University in its series Working Papers with number FNU-149.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision: Oct 2007
Handle: RePEc:sgc:wpaper:149

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Related research
Keywords: game theory integrated assessment modeling farsighted stability D'Aspremont stability coalition formation

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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  1. Carraro, Carlo & Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael, 2005. "Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 5046, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Ioannidis, Alexis & Papandreou, Andreas & Sartzetakis, Eftichios, 2000. "International Environmental Agreements: a Literature Review," Cahiers de recherche 0008, GREEN. [Downloadable!]
  3. Chandler, P. & Tulkens, H., 1995. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Papers 9550, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
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  4. Claude, et al d'Aspremont, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Working Papers 897, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  6. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007. "Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers FNU-140, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Jul 2007. [Downloadable!]
  7. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, . "International Environmental Agreements -The Role of Foresight," Economics Working Papers 2002-10, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
  8. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios Sartzetakis, 2002. "Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach," Others 0201001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2005. "The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection," Working Papers FNU-82, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2006. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Parkash CHANDER & Henry TULKENS, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion," SCAPE Policy Research Working Paper Series 0609, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics, SCAPE. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Michael Hoel, 1992. "International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 141-159, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Papers 21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
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  14. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2008. "Evolution in time of Farsightedly Stable Coalitions: An Application of FUND," Working Papers FNU-162, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2008. [Downloadable!]
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