A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions

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A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions

Author Info

Dritan Osmani
Richard S.J. Tol () (Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland)

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Abstract

Non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) use the assumption that coalition of signatories maximize their joint welfare. The joint maxi- mization assumption is compared with di®erent sharing pro¯t schemes such as Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and Consensus Value. The results show that the joint welfare max- imization assumption is similar with Nash Bargaining solution.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University in its series Working Papers with number FNU-150.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision: Oct 2007
Handle: RePEc:sgc:wpaper:150

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Article
- Dritan Osmani & Richard S J Tol, 2008. "A Short Note on Joint Welfare Maximization Assumption," Icfai University Journal of Managerial Economics, Icfai Press, vol. 0(3), pages 22-39, August.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2007-10-27 (All new papers)
NEP-ENV-2007-10-27 (Environmental Economics)
NEP-GTH-2007-10-27 (Game Theory)

References listed on IDEAS
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Other versions:
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Other versions:
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Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2005. "The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection," Working Papers FNU-82, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2006. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Osmani, Dritan & Tol, Richard, 2006. "The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection," MPRA Paper 4256, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Parkash CHANDER & Henry TULKENS, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion," SCAPE Policy Research Working Paper Series 0609, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics, SCAPE. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion," Working Papers 2006.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Working Papers 886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2004. "The consensus value : a new solution concept for cooperative games," Discussion Paper 50, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]

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