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Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements

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  • de Zeeuw, A.J.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

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  • de Zeeuw, A.J., 2008. "Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements," Other publications TiSEM 41f27f71-d6e6-463e-9b03-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:41f27f71-d6e6-463e-9b03-f4e857ff1c53
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2018. "International Environmental Agreements—The Role of Foresight," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(1), pages 241-257, September.
    2. Frederick Ploeg & Aart Zeeuw, 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 117-139, March.
    3. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 176-193, Springer.
    4. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    5. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
    6. Carraro,Carlo & Siniscalco,Domenico (ed.), 1997. "New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521590891.
    7. Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra, 1998. "Coalitional Power and Public Goods," Working Papers 98-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    8. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    9. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    10. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329.
    11. Karp, Larry & Zhao, Jinhua, 2007. "A Proposal to Reform the Kyoto Protocol: the Role of Escape Clauses and Foresight," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt5b10v2jr, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    12. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Coalitional Power and Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(6), pages 1355-1384, December.
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