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Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty

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  • Nicholas E. Burger
  • Charles D. Kolstad

Abstract

The literature on voluntary provision of public goods includes recent theoretical work on the formation of voluntary coalitions to provide public goods. Theory is ambiguous on the equilibrium coalition size and contribution rates. We examine the emergence of coalitions, their size, and how uncertainty in public goods provision affects contribution levels and coalition size. We find that contributions decrease when public good returns are uncertain but increase when individuals can form a coalition to provide the good. Contrary a core theoretical result, we find that coalition size increases when the public good benefits are higher. Uncertainty has no effect on coalition size.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15543.

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Date of creation: Nov 2009
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15543

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Cited by:
  1. Fuhai HONG & Larry KARP, 2013. "International Environmental Agreements with Endogenous or Exogenous Risk," Economic Growth centre Working Paper Series, Nanyang Technolgical University, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Economic Growth centre 1310, Nanyang Technolgical University, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Economic Growth centre.
  2. Karp, Larry & Simon, Leo, 2013. "Participation games and international environmental agreements: A non-parametric model," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 326-344.
  3. Astrid Dannenberg & Andreas Lange & Bodo Sturm, 2010. "On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods - Experimental Evidence from the Lab," NBER Working Papers 15967, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Hong, Fuhai & Karp, Larry, 2012. "International Environmental Agreements with mixed strategies and investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 685-697.
  5. Charles D. Kolstad, 2011. "Public Goods Agreements with Other-Regarding Preferences," NBER Working Papers 17017, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Ansink, Erik & Bouma, Jetske, 2013. "Effective support for community resource management," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 94-103.
  7. Charles D. Kolstad, 2014. "International Environmental Agreements among Heterogeneous Countries with Social Preferences," NBER Working Papers 20204, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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