On Commons and Tragedies
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 73 (1983)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
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- Ellis, Christopher J., 2001. "Common Pool Equities: An Arbitrage Based Non-cooperative Solution to the Common Pool Resource Problem," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 140-155, September.
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2012-02, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.
- Velez, Maria Alejandra & Stranlund, John K. & Murphy, James J., 2012. "Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 185-192.
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- Julio Peñ-Torres, 1999. "Harvesting Preemption, Industrial Concentration and Enclosure of National Marine Fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 14(4), pages 545-571, December.
- Nitzan, Shmuel & Ueda, Kaoru, 2009. "Collective contests for commons and club goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 48-55, February.
- Roger Hartley & Richard Cornes, 2004. "Mixed sharing rules," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 196, Econometric Society.
- Santiago S?chez-Pag?, . "Rivalry, Exclusion and Coalitions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 547.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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