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Long-Term Competition in a Dynamic Game: The Cold Fish War

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  • Jonathan Cave
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    Abstract

    This article presents a model of credible, voluntary, collective agreements in a dynamic game. These agreements are implicit in collections of history-dependent (threat) strategies. I consider the strategies in a game of resource exploitation. Credibility is represented by perfect equilibrium. Voluntarism requires at least that all behavior be supported by the threat of collapse of the agreement, which would return the players to the memoryless equilibrium. Collective rationality requires that the agreement be robust to the possibility of mutually beneficial renegotiation. I analyze the set of agreements meeting each of these restrictions.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 18 (1987)
    Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
    Pages: 596-610

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    Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:18:y:1987:i:winter:p:596-610

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    Cited by:
    1. Rabah Amir & Niels Nannerup, 2006. "Information Structure and the Tragedy of the Commons in Resource Extraction," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 147-165, August.
    2. Rodrigo Harrison & Roger Laguno ff, 2013. "Dynamic Mechanism Design for a Global Commons," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000831, David K. Levine.
    3. Breton, Michèle & Keoula, Michel Yevenunye, 2014. "A great fish war model with asymmetric players," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 209-223.
    4. Emilio Calvo & Santiago J. Rubio, 2012. "Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0112, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
    5. Petros G. Sekeris, 2012. "The Tragedy of the Commons in a Violent World," Working Papers 1213, University of Namur, Department of Economics.

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